Small, often island, societies have often been described as subject to extensive personalisation: meaning that their social, economic and political life can be heavily impacted and driven by decisions that are taken by and for people who know each other.
Classical sociologists, going back to Comte, Durkheim, Tönnies and Weber, assumed that the march towards modernity was universal, unstoppable and one-way: the practices of rural, traditional societies would eventually give way to more scientific, rational and secular behaviour; and that the ‘ascribed criteria’ that governed status and social standing in such societies – issues like lineage, family, tribe or race – would gradually be replaced by ‘achieved criteria’ – such as merit, qualification and experience (e.g. Foner, 1979). This movement has happened, with the inexorable march of urbanisation, institutionalisation and globalisation. However, the transition has been complex: nepotism still exists and is regularly exposed in scandals. While, in other cases, the thrust to modernity has even been reversed: small, ‘face-to-face’ societies persist; and there are various ‘lifestyle refugees’ who are willing and able to leave the anonymous metropolis and its “lonely crowd” (Reisman et al., 1961) and instead settle (back) in/on small island communities where children can grow up safely surrounded by family and neighbours who make it their business to know and watch out for each other (Baldacchino & Starc, 2021).
When David Weale, from Prince Edward Island, Canada (population: 150,000) talks about growing up “in a straitjacket of community surveillance” (Weale, 1992, p. 9), he refers both to the comfort and protection afforded by this organic security regime; as well as its oppressive presence.
“Hyper personalisation” is especially active in small jurisdictions (Veenendaal, 2014), where “everybody knows everybody” (Corbett, 2015), the layers of government are thin and local, and where the state is soft and transparent, and so decision makers are known and cannot hide between seams of political or bureaucratic cadres, for better or for worse.
Corbett & Veenendaal (2017, p. 31) propose six dimensions of personalisation in the political sphere: (1) a strong connection between individual leaders and constituents; (2) a limited private sphere; (3) a limited role for ideology and programmatic policy debate; (4) strong political polarisation; (5) the ubiquity of patronage; and (6) the capacity of individual leaders to dominate all aspects of public life. These dimensions are significant in small (often island) political systems, and where political actors and their voting publics can and do seek each other out and develop personal relationships. Such behaviour is rendered more possible and plausible when the number of votes required to elect a politician is low. Personalisation can also explain high voter turnout in small jurisdictions where it is not even necessary to incentivise voting by fining those who do not vote: in such locations, individual citizens cannot afford to be seen not to vote (Hirczy, 1995).
In the social and economic spheres, personalisation is also driven by the robustness and resilience of family, kinship and friendship networks. Connections become embroiled in obligations which are hard to dismiss; and the expectation to put ‘family first’ will be hard to resist, and with serious consequences. Workplaces, in particular, will be occupied by workers who are related to each other, will have sympathies or antipathies for each other, who form part of an ‘old boys’ or ‘old girls’ network … and these informal dynamics will not always be self-evident to their managers, to the latter’s desperation and frustration (Baldacchino, 1997).
Personalisation confronts, tweaks and infects the practice of institutions which, by definition, are meant to be fair by being faceless. Institutions are meant to work on principles of legality and rationality, whereby those who perform tasks are so recruited and designated on the basis of contractual, warranted and/or credentialed parameters. But this does not always happen; although extreme lengths may be taken to keep up the pretence. A difficulty arises when, for example, an individual with a particular skill set needs to be engaged; yet that person is expected to ‘go through the motions’ of what the institution demands in terms of the hiring process: e.g. submitting application, shortlisting, interview, tendering documentation, health checks, etc. – in order to get recruited.
Baldacchino, G. (1997). Global tourism and informal labour relations; The small scale syndrome at work. London: Mansell.
Baldacchino, G., & Starc, N. (2021). The virtues of insularity: Pondering a new chapter in the historical geography of islands. Geography Compass, 15(12), e12596.
Corbett, J. (2015). “Everybody knows everybody”: Practising politics in the Pacific Islands. Democratization, 22(1), 51-72.
Corbett, J. & Veenendaal, W. (2017). The personalisation of democratic leadership? Evidence from small states. Social Alternatives, 36(3), 31-36.
Foner, A. (1979). Ascribed and achieved bases of stratification. Annual Review of Sociology, 5(1), 219-242.
Hirczy, W. (1995). Explaining near‐universal turnout: The case of Malta. European Journal of Political Research, 27(2), 255-272.
Riesman, D., Glazer, N., & Denney, R. (1961). The lonely crowd: A study of the changing American character. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Veenendaal, W. (2014). Politics and democracy in microstates. London: Routledge.
Weale, D. (1992). Them times. Charlottetown, Canada: Acorn Press.